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346 Abstract
Increasing investments in resource efficiency is considered essential for transi-
tioning towards a sustainable model of economic growth. This article presents 
evidence on the complex incentives, trade-offs, and challenges associated with the 
economics and politics of resource efficiency investments, especially in light of the 
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement. By synthesis-
ing and evaluating a wide range of empirical evidence, practitioners’ insights, 
and policy perspectives, this article carefully examines the role of resource effi-
ciency in reconciling environmental and economic objectives. It makes particular 
reference to the investment barriers and transitional implications of moving econ-
omies towards more circular and resource efficient pathways. In doing so, it pro-
vides a policy-oriented guide and toolbox to help overcome barriers, unlock the 
economic potential of resource efficiency, and highlight the challenges associated 
with the resource transition. Overall, this article brings together evidence, aiming 
to further develop and propose new strategies for improving the efficient use of 
natural resources to advance the sustainable development agenda.
Keywords: resource efficiency, sustainable development, investments, circular 
economy, eco-innovation
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of resource efficiency – paraphrased as doing more with less – is 
receiving increasing attention by researchers, policy makers, the private sector, 
and the broader public (Bleischwitz et al., 2018). This augmented interest in effi-
ciency increases is not least due to increasingly volatile resource prices, uncertain 
supply prospects, attempts to revitalise industrial production, and concerns over 
environmental pressures associated with the use of natural resources. Also related 
to strategic concerns regarding resource nationalism, scarcity and supply restric-
tions of critical raw materials with the potential to severely disrupt global value 
chains, resource efficiency is seen as a viable approach to combining economic 
objectives, such as competitiveness, employment and productivity growth, with 
environmental ones, including achieving the pledges made under the Paris Cli-
mate Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
With a view to implementing the resource transition in practice, i.e. the move 
towards greater resource efficiency and circularity (Flachenecker and Rentschler, 
2018), targeted investments are considered to be a key tool for improving resource 
efficiency in order to address the aforementioned challenges, while delivering 
multiple economic and environmental benefits (Peake and Ekins, 2016). In recent 
years, numerous policy initiatives have highlighted the important role of resource 
efficiency in national and international agendas: 
– The SDGs, in particular SDG 8, to achieve sustainable economic growth, 
and SDG 12, to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns. 
For both SDGs, resource efficiency (or more precisely material productiv-
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347– the G7 Alliance for Resource Efficiency and the G20 Resource Efficiency 
Dialogue;
– the European Union (EU) Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe, Raw 
Materials Initiative, Circular Economy Action Plan, Reflection Paper 
Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030, and the recently announced Euro-
pean Green Deal as part of the Political Guidelines for the 2019-2024 Euro-
pean Commission (EC, 2008; 2011; 2015; 2019; von der Leyen, 2019);
– the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) on resource efficiency, green growth, environmental-economic 
accounting, and sustainable finance (OECD, 2016; 2017a; 2017b; 2019);
– international financial institutions that provide substantial funding for 
resource efficiency projects include the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the 
International Finance Corporation of the World Bank (IFC) (EBRD, 2015; 
EIB, 2015; IFC, 2011); 
– the United Nations have established the International Resource Panel 
(IRP), a dedicated commission of experts on the issue (UNEP IRP; 2014; 
2016; 2017).
All these initiatives are underpinned by national, regional, and local efforts to 
scale-up resource efficiency investments to divert wastage back into value chains 
(Bahn-Walkowiak and Steger, 2015). However, despite such high-level efforts to 
mainstream the resource efficiency agenda, policy measures still lack a coherent, 
systematic approach and large-scale implementation; even frontrunners such as 
the EU have yet to deliver on their ambitious goals (Flachenecker, 2015).
Over the next years, technological shifts (e.g., new energy vehicles, renewable 
energy, 5G infrastructure) and the implementation of the SDGs are bound to 
increase the demand for certain material resources (Bleischwitz and Flachenecker, 
2017). Despite existing evidence for the potential benefits of resource efficiency 
investments, the improvements have been falling short of expectations and the 
benefits have been lower than expected. For instance, Flachenecker, Rentschler 
and de Kleuver (2018) show that globally, resource efficiency has increased by 
only about 1% per annum over more than three decades. One central reason for 
this shortcoming has been that the challenges of wide-scale implementation have 
been underestimated, as firms and consumers were frequently unable or unwilling 
to invest in resource efficiency measures (Rentschler, Bleischwitz and Flache-
necker, 2018). This raises the question of what has been missing in contemporary 
resource efficiency efforts to streamline and scale-up investments to make econo-
mies more resource efficient and environmental sustainable.
What becomes apparent from the ongoing policy discourse on resource efficiency 
is that the debate has focused predominantly on goals, and on the benefits of being 
more resource efficient – but not on how to actually achieve higher efficiency of 
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348 governance dimension; this includes the question about the kind of investments 
that are chosen to achieve the objectives. Evidence and insights from the academic 
literature, policy making, and the private sector indicate that resource efficiency 
investments are associated with multiple challenges. For instance, efficiency 
investments per se may not necessarily deliver positive net benefits, particularly 
when negative externalities and the cost of inaction are not accounted for in 
investment appraisals (Flachenecker, Bleischwitz and Rentschler, 2017). As 
Flachenecker and Kornejew (2019) show, benefits from resource efficiency invest-
ments for some firms, sectors or countries might come at the expense of others, 
thus reducing the economy-wide effects. Moreover, market barriers, failures and 
structural inefficiencies often prevent firms and individuals from implementing 
resource efficiency investments, thereby jeopardising the potential of moving 
towards resource efficient economies in the first place. 
Against this backdrop, this article explores the decisive factors that determine the 
success of the resource transition and focuses in particular on resource efficiency 
investments. By critically reviewing the existing literature and synthesising evi-
dence at the country and firm level, it examines how the potential of resource 
efficiency investments can be unlocked, and what resource efficiency can deliver 
and what it cannot. It also discusses how resource efficiency investments relate to 
two crucial and interrelated issues of our time – sustainable development and cli-
mate change. Accordingly, it identifies practical measures for overcoming existing 
barriers and creating incentives for promoting resource efficiency investments.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the concepts and trends in 
resource efficiency. Section 3 synthesises and evaluates the evidence on barriers, 
opportunities, and trade-offs, including the transitional effects of resource effi-
ciency investments. Section 4 describes the role of investors and policy makers in 
implementing the resource efficiency agenda by analysing their insights in prac-
tice. Section 5 indicates existing research gaps, and Section 6 concludes.
2 CONCEPTS AND TRENDS IN RESOURCE EFFICIENCY
While improved resource efficiency is a frequently stated objective, general pol-
icy discourse does not always reflect a thorough understanding of the specific 
indicators and policy implications involved. Van Ewijk (2018) introduces resource 
efficiency by clarifying its concepts, definitions, possibilities, and limitations. The 
author argues that resource efficiency, and the related concept of the circular econ-
omy, are perspectives on the relation between the economy and the natural envi-
ronment. A conceptual map of resource efficiency describes its main components 
and clarifies its main purpose: to minimise material inputs, maximise economic 
outputs, and respect the limits of the environment. The contribution also discusses 
the linkages between resource use and the economy, and contrasts the economic 
view on efficiency with the engineering perspective. Finally, the environmental 
impacts of resources are discussed from a life-cycle perspective. Van Ewijk (2018) 
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349and economic goals: the lack of alignment between individual company perfor-
mance and total life-cycle impacts, the environmental rebound effect, and physi-
cal limits to efficient and cyclical use of material resources.
Indeed, these challenges are key to explaining the slow progress that countries 
have made in increasing resource efficiency – despite seemingly strong economic 
and environmental arguments, and ambitious policy goals. Flachenecker, Rent-
schler and de Kleuver (2018) demonstrate that monitoring resource efficiency 
developments is important for identifying efficiency shortfalls, assessing econ-
omy-wide effects of resource efficiency improvement potential, and building or 
maintaining political momentum. To this end, the authors offer an overview of 
existing indicators and data sources with which to measure resource use and 
resource efficiency.
Domestic material consumption (DMC) is one of the indicators most frequently 
used to monitor material resources and material productivity (often referred to as 
resource efficiency). DMC is part of the indicator set to monitor the SDGs, spe-
cifically SDGs 8.4 and 12.2. DMC comprises domestically extracted material 
resources, adds all imported material resources, and subtracts all exported mate-
rial resources. Numerous heterogeneous materials are combined by using their 
weight as a common unit of account, which raises problematic issues; for instance, 
sand and gravel dominate the DMC indicator in most countries (Flachenecker, 
Rentschler and de Kleuver, 2018). Another limitation of DMC is that it does not 
consider the indirect material used that is embodied in, for instance, intermediate 
goods that are imported. DMC is ‘blind’ to material leakage – the process of off-
shoring production and importing intermediate or final goods leading to a lower 
domestic material consumption and ceteris paribus to higher resource efficiency 
(Wilts and Bleischwitz, 2012). The related yet more comprehensive indicator raw 
material consumption (RMC) partially accounts for this shortcoming, but access 
to data across country and industries, and over time, remains a bottleneck. This is 
also related to ongoing work on implementing an international consensus on the 
methodical underpinnings of the RMC indicator and the development of global 
databases (UNCEEA, 2018).
Flachenecker, Rentschler and de Kleuver (2018) offer an overview of historic 
trends in resource use, trade, prices, and efficiency from global and regional per-
spectives. The data on DMC illustrate that resource efficiency has increased over 
time, albeit slowly. Overall, an increasing efficiency trend is evident both globally 
and for all considered regional groupings mentioned below. At the global level, 
resource efficiency can be seen to have increased by 30% in the period from 1980 
to 2010 – i.e., 30% fewer material resources are used to generate a unit of eco-
nomic output. This global average means that on average, resource efficiency 
increases by about 0.9% per year. More recent calculations for 1970-2015 confirm 
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350 However, regional patterns are heterogeneous. Over the same period, resource 
efficiency has increased in Africa (8%), Oceania (56%), Europe (49%; EU-28), 
North America (95%; N.A.), and Latin America (52%; L.A.). The large increases 
in North America and Europe can be partly explained by offshoring material-
intensive production and importing intermediate products, which do not reflect all 
embodied materials, thus artificially depicting large increases in material produc-
tivity. In Asia, resource efficiency has slightly decreased between 1980 and 2010 
(-1%). This drop is mainly triggered by a significant fall in resource efficiency 
until the mid-1980s, which was predominantly due to a significant shift from agri-
culture-based economies to more resource intensive manufacturing. 
Figure 1






















































































Note: Computed as GDP/DMC, and measured in purchasing power parity in USD per kilo-
gramme of material use. 
Sources: (Flachenecker, Rentschler and de Kleuver, 2018; SERI, 2013).
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the observed efficiency increases do not 
at all offset the increase in absolute material resource use, which more than dou-
bled between 1970 and 2017. More specifically, since the late 1990s, mineral 
resources have accounted for the biggest share in DMC – approximately 44% in 
2010. Minerals (and to a lesser extent fossil fuels) are the key driver of the rapid 
growth in DMC – mineral usage nearly tripled in the considered time frame, in 
particular the use of sand and gravel, which is used in construction. Thus, the 
relatively low levels of resource efficiency increases are to a large extent due to 
the infrastructure boom in Asia, especially in China. In short, the observed effi-
ciency improvements have not resulted in a decrease of resource use in absolute 
terms, thus indicating that the environmental pressures associated with an increase 
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3513  PREREQUISITES FOR TAKING ACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE 
BARRIERS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND TRADE-OFFS OF RESOURCE 
EFFICIENCY
3.1  TO MAKE PROGRESS, FIRST IDENTIFY BARRIERS OBSTRUCTING 
ACTION
Resource efficiency is a policy objective with the potential of delivering a double 
dividend, yielding both economic and environmental benefits. Yet, slow progress 
in increasing resource efficiency highlights that economic actors face significant 
barriers that prevent the investments that are needed for rapid progress. Indeed, 
the relatively slow adoption of cost-effective technologies – such as building insu-
lation or LED lighting – demonstrates that investments may fail to materialise 
even when cost-benefit analyses and appraisals of investments in resource effi-
ciency conclude positive net benefits. To understand and categorise these barriers 
Rentschler, Bleischwitz and Flachenecker (2018) refer to the two Fundamental 
Theorems of Welfare Economics: The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem sug-
gests perfectly competitive markets as a hypothetical benchmark for investigating 
the efficiency of actual market outcomes. Such perfectly competitive markets are 
based on several assumptions, including perfect information, no oligo- or monop-
olies, no barriers to market entry (or exit), perfect factor mobility, zero transaction 
costs, and absence of externalities (Varian, 2010).
The violation of any of these assumptions leads to market failures, including 
information bias, externalities, moral hazard, among others, which create ineffi-
ciencies and waste of productive inputs. Rentschler, Bleischwitz and Flachenecker 
(2018) show that, in practice, there are ubiquitous violations of these assumptions, 
and firms are faced by a range of market frictions and barriers, which prevent 
investments in efficiency and low-carbon technologies. For instance, information 
or capacity constraints can prevent firms from making informed decisions, access-
ing best available technologies, or operating and maintaining latest technology. 
Missing or inefficient markets (e.g., for credit) can constrain the implementation 
of efficiency-enhancing measures. Other missing markets (e.g., for carbon) can 
lead to severe externalities and excess waste. Large firms and protected industries 
face little competitive pressure to invest in efficiency gains, especially if protec-
tionist trade policies are in place. This may also mean that the cost of inefficiency 
is simply passed on to consumers, while firms take no further efficiency-enhanc-
ing measures. It tends to be difficult and expensive to adjust physical production 
infrastructure to frequently changing market conditions, leading to long-term 
technology lock-in. Overall, these market frictions may mean that investments do 
not deliver the anticipated resource efficiency gains, or that investors are unable 
(or unwilling) to undertake them in the first place.
By providing evidence from a large number of countries and regions, Rentschler, 
Bleischwitz and Flachenecker (2018) demonstrate that resource markets are char-
acterised by inefficiency: in many countries resource productivity remains low, 
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352 technologies. The authors show that the factors that cause and perpetuate such 
inefficiencies can be categorised in five main types (summarised in Table 1): 
 i. information availability and access;
 ii. technical, managerial, and institutional capacity;
 iii. financial markets;
 iv. market structure and competition; and 
 v. public policy and regulation of resource markets. 
Each of these categories encompasses a range of complex challenges. For exam-
ple, several types of information constraints can play a central role in causing 
inefficiencies and preventing investments: Inadequate monitoring of resource 
efficiency-related performance indicators at the firm level may make it difficult 
for firms to identify and address efficiency gaps. Lacking information disclosure 
on the part of firms makes it difficult for policy makers to design targeted policies 
and support mechanisms for improving resource efficiency at a wider scale. If 
firms cannot access relevant information on resource efficient technologies and 
processes, it is likely to impair their ability to implement effective resource effi-
ciency projects. 
Moreover, the different types of investment barriers are often interlinked and can 
reinforce each other. For instance, the lack of information can lead to an overly 
negative risk assessment of efficiency-enhancing investments, thus making access 
to credit even more difficult than it already is. To overcome the resulting financing 
constraints, public policy interventions and development financing can be crucial 
to showcase effective solutions and thus stimulate investments in resource effi-
ciency. Section 4.1 provides specific case studies highlighting the aforementioned 
investment constraints.
In addition, systemic risks and uncertainty can prevent forward looking invest-
ment decisions and lead to policy myopia. While such uncertainty can materialise 
in different forms (e.g., commodity prices, macroeconomic fundamentals, or 
socio-political conditions), it commonly results in risk averseness and reduced 
planning horizons. For instance, increased volatility of resource prices increases 
the perceived uncertainty surrounding future price developments – this in turn can 
have a substantial impact on the payback periods of resource-related investments 
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353Table 1
Barriers to investments in resource efficiency
Investment 
barriers at 











































































 Economic, political and social  
stability
Policy reliability
Can exacerbate existing barriers
Note: Underinvestment in resource efficiency can be due to various market or government fail-
ures. Barriers extend from the individual level, to firms and governments. Systemic risks and 
uncertainty do not necessarily cause inefficiency – but they may exacerbate the adverse effects 
of existing barriers.1 
Source: Rentschler, Bleischwitz and Flachenecker (2018).
In many cases the drivers of inefficiency can be traced back to market failures or 
inadequate public policy. Leading to distorted incentives, and perpetuating pre-
existing inefficiencies, they can constitute substantial barriers to investments into 
resource efficiency – even if these investments are found to be cost-effective. 
However, on the flipside, the Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem assigns an 
important role to market interventions (e.g., by governments), stating that they 
may improve Pareto Efficiency of a given economic allocation by redistributing 
resources. Especially, the interplay of multiple market inefficiencies and invest-
ment barriers means that policy measures need to be designed, not only to help 
investors cope and overcome these barriers, but also to address the systemic 
causes of market inefficiencies in the first place (UNEP IRP, 2017). In addition, a 
prerequisite for effective policy making is a thorough understanding of both the 
benefits and the potential costs and risks associated with investments in resource 
efficiency (Flachenecker, Bleischwitz and Rentschler, 2017).
1 The analysis presented in this article builds on the framework presented in Chapter 2 of the World Develop-
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354 3.2  TAKING EFFECTIVE ACTION REQUIRES UNDERSTANDING  
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND TRADE-OFFS 
Even though increased resource efficiency is considered to yield multiple economic 
and environmental benefits once barriers do not materialise, it is only gradually 
increasing across regions, countries, and firms. To investigate the incentives and dis-
incentives for firms to invest in resource efficiency, the literature often relies on cost-
benefit analyses (CBAs). However, conventional CBAs predominantly consider 
primary financial implications of investments (i.e., the monetary costs incurred by 
firms), failing to account for the particular nature of resource efficiency investments. 
To this end, Flachenecker, Bleischwitz and Rentschler (2018) introduces a com-
prehensive cost-benefit framework to assess ex ante the viability of investments in 
resource efficiency by not only taking financial costs and benefits into account, 
but to also by considering environmental, non-market, and secondary implications 
– which are often associated with externalities. The framework summarised in 
Table 2 is based on a synthesis of the existing academic literature and comprises 
several components of resource efficiency investments by
 i. comparing a business-as-usual scenario (i.e., maintaining the current rate of 
investments) with a scenario of scaling-up investments in resource efficiency 
(i.e., firms significantly increase their investments in efficiency improve-
ments), 
 ii. covering economic and environmental dimensions, due to data availability 
constraints often restricted to climate change mitigation aspects, and 
 iii. considering primary and secondary effects (i.e., indirect or second round 
effects, multiplier, spill-overs, and co-benefits/co-costs). 
Table 2
Primary and secondary costs and benefits from resource efficiency investments
Potential costs and benefits of investments in resource efficiency
Benefits Costs
Environmental Economic Environmental Economic
Business as 
usual















Firm level costs 
(e.g. exposure to 
volatility)
Country level 
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355Potential costs and benefits of investments in resource efficiency
Benefits Costs












































Note: The framework distinguishes between two scenarios (business-as-usual and scaling up 
resource efficiency investments) and two dimensions (environmental and economic). 
Source: Flachenecker, Bleischwitz and Rentschler (2018).
As a case study, this framework is applied to a firm level investment project com-
prising a range of resource efficiency measures, including energy and material 
efficiency aspects, in particular measures that are linked to the production tech-
niques of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plastics. Flachenecker, Bleischwitz and Rent-
schler (2018) show that for this particular case study the CBA is significantly 
affected by internalising and monetising environmental externalities (even by 
applying conservative costs of climate-related damages (Clements et al., 2013)), 
taking into account the cost of inaction as an informative benchmark, and consid-
ering the time horizons of firms since the aforementioned resource efficiency 
investment project is more likely to result in positive net benefits the longer the 
planning horizon of the firm is. 
In this context, Rentschler, Flachenecker and Kornejew (2018) show that a con-
sistent and practical indicator can help to assess the carbon emission savings of 
resource efficiency investments, and translate them into monetary savings. This 
can help firms to identify and prioritise projects, and benchmark their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission savings vis-à-vis other projects and the national emission 
reduction pathways. Such consistent accounting of corporate emission savings 
can also help governments to monitor progress towards national efficiency targets 
or international commitments. 
After having considered resource efficiency investments from an ex ante perspec-
tive, the ex post view of the effects of resource efficiency investments is equally 
important from an economic and political perspective. In this context, ex post 
analyses also provide information on the incentive structure of actors that are 
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356 The focus here will be the effects of resource efficiency on competitiveness and 
GHG emissions, given that these are two key policy targets of the resource effi-
ciency agenda (Rosenstock and Flachenecker, 2018). As previously mentioned, 
the majority of the academic studies investigating these linkages suggest that 
increasing resource efficiency improves competitiveness as well as supports cli-
mate change mitigation efforts (Bassi, Tan and Mbi, 2012; Bleischwitz et al., 
2007; Bleischwitz and Steger, 2009; Distelkamp, Meyer and Meyer, 2010; Gilbert 
et al., 2016; Meyer, Meyer and Distelkamp, 2011; Sakamoto and Managi, 2017; 
Schröter, Lerch and Jäger, 2011; Walz, 2011). 
Flachenecker (2018) critically reviews the existing evidence base on the effects of 
resource efficiency on firm and country level competitiveness as well as GHG 
emissions. While the understanding of the effects of resource efficiency on com-
petitiveness and climate change mitigation is growing, there are two prevalent 
shortcomings in the current evidence base. First, most investigations draw strong 
conclusions based on case studies, thus limiting the external validity of the find-
ings. Second, studies across firms, sectors, and countries often face methodologi-
cal problems, including the problematic issue of reverse causality (i.e., it is diffi-
cult to isolate whether resource efficiency is the cause and/or the consequence of 
increased competitiveness). Both issues can severely limit the external and inter-
nal validity of the results, in particular since reverse causality can result in biased 
and inconsistent estimates (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
The concept of competitiveness is another point of scrutiny since in the policy 
debates it is often merely used in the context of price competitiveness measured 
by standard cost and trade indicators, including unit labour costs, the real effective 
exchange rate, interest rates, and the current account (Siggel, 2006). However, 
Porter (1990) argues that such measures focusing on costs are insufficient to 
explain a competitive advantage. For instance, a fall in wages or the exchange rate 
does not make a country more competitive if one considers that competitiveness 
follows a much broader definition aiming to raise the standard of living (Snowdon 
and Stonehouse, 2006). Aiginger (2006) suggests that price competitiveness is a 
useful measure within the framework of perfectly competitive markets and in 
developing economies since they often tend to compete in a homogeneous goods 
market, but it is less useful in imperfect markets and developed economies, as 
they typically compete in innovations, qualities as well as environmentally sus-
tainable and socially inclusive growth (Rozmahel, Grochová and Litzman, 2014).2 
Hence, price measures are a relevant factor in determining competitiveness that is, 
however, by itself insufficient and potentially misleading without being comple-
mented by non-price indicators reflecting welfare creation and its distribution 
2 This has previously been discussed in the literature as the Kaldor paradox which originates from relative 
unit labour costs being positively correlated with the relative market share of manufacturing exports (Kaldor, 
1978). Hence, Kaldor (1978) questioned “the relative importance of price (or cost?) competition, as against 





































































43 (4) 345-373 (2019)
357(Aiginger, 2006; Lehner, Bierter Charles, 1999; Reinert, 1995; Salvatore, 2010; 
Snowdon & Stonehouse, 2006; Voinescu and Moisoiu, 2015). 
Furthermore, Flachenecker (2018) provides empirical evidence on the causal link 
between resource efficiency and competitiveness as well as GHG emissions for 
EU countries. Since higher resource efficiency can be a consequence of high com-
petitiveness – and vice versa – the author applies an instrumental variable approach 
to assess the direction of causality. Both macroeconomic and firm-level data are 
used to assess the effects of resource efficiency at the country, sector, and firm 
levels. An indicator set is used to approximate competitiveness on the macroeco-
nomic level, while the market share growth rate approximates competitiveness at 
the firm level. The results suggest that there is no robust effect of resource effi-
ciency at the country level for most competitiveness indicators, except for wage 
growth (and to a lesser extent the current account). This suggests that employees 
might be compensated beyond their labour productivity increase, as part of the 
resource productivity increase is also passed on to them. At the firm level, how-
ever, the results indicate that firms for which the availability of public finance is 
the main motivation for eco-innovation have a 27% higher likelihood of improv-
ing their resource efficiency. The estimations also provide evidence that increas-
ing resource efficiency causes firm-level competitiveness (i.e., market share 
growth) to increase by around 12%. The results also show that the probability of 
reducing GHG emissions for the average firm increases by around 34% as a result 
of an increase in resource efficiency. 
These empirical findings provide evidence that resource efficiency at the firm 
level not only improves the competitiveness of firms but also contributes to miti-
gating climate change. However, the results are heterogeneously distributed 
across firms, sectors and countries. A further breakdown reveals that certain coun-
tries, such as Estonia, Italy, Portugal, and Romania, benefit from resource effi-
ciency improvements, while others do not. Regarding sectors, it becomes apparent 
that certain material-intensive sectors are more likely to benefit (e.g., waste man-
agement, manufacturing of basic metals, wood, and paper). 
Therefore, this section draws conclusions on the opportunities and trade-offs of 
resource efficiency investments with a detailed view on their effects on competi-
tiveness and climate change mitigation. In particular, it is essential to better under-
stand potential trade-offs between firms, sectors, regions, and countries, thus iden-
tifying the winners and losers in advancing the economy to a more resource effi-
cient path. Such trade-offs may arise even though CBAs are positive for individual 
firms and investment barriers do not hinder investments from taking place. Cru-
cially, an important policy insight can be distilled from these results: investments 
in eco-innovations incentivised by public finance can support certain firms in cap-
turing the benefits from resource efficiency improvements, but the resource tran-
sition is likely to have adverse effects on other economic actors, which need to be 
monitored and mitigated to ensure political support of further pursuing the 
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358 4  HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND GOVERNMENTS CAN OVERCOME 
OBSTACLES TO ENABLE RESOURCE EFFICIENCY INVESTMENTS
4.1  FINANCING EFFICIENCY: THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT BANKS  
AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
As Section 3.1 has argued, inefficient resource use is entrenched by a range of 
mutually reinforcing investment barriers. Together these barriers can form an 
inefficient equilibrium or lock-in situation in which local actors – including firms 
and banks – lack the information, capacity, financing, or incentives to invest in 
costly resource efficiency measures. For instance, without a first mover investor 
that adopts modern more efficient technologies, other firms will not be incentiv- 
ised to follow, and banks may be unwilling to offer financing for unknown tech-
nologies and project proposals without a proven local track record (Rentschler, 
2018). Information barriers may mean that international experience does not 
translate into local confidence. In this context, external actors and investors – such 
as multilateral development banks (MDBs) – can play a key role in breaking the 
lock-in by investing in first movers and thus demonstrating the commercial viabil-
ity of resource efficiency investments to the wider market. Goovaerts and Verbeek 
(2018) and Jollands and Hirsch (2018) offer an insight into the rationale of such 
MDBs with recent examples from the EIB and EBRD, respectively. 
Drawing on experience in practice, Goovaerts and Verbeek (2018) identify four 
challenges from an investor’s perspective to the financing of resource efficiency 
and circular investment projects. First, technological and operational innovation 
risks often restrict the resource efficiency and circular economy business models 
to be financed. The issue at stake here is that such business models are often char-
acterised by significant technological and operational risk. In the case of process-
related risks, some processes are based on specific inputs and would not be guar-
anteed in case of a modification of the feedstock. New technologies have by defi-
nition no performance track record and hence entail ramp-up/implementation 
risks, to which one can add the related uncertainty about operational costs. Many 
circular projects based on non-technological innovation will likely be less replica-
ble compared to their conventional innovation counterparts, because they may 
concern different transition styles, forms of innovation, markets, industries, types 
of companies involved in industrial symbioses, etc. As a result, one would have to 
wait until several similar projects are implemented before being able to draw con-
clusions and apply them with respect to other projects appraisals.
Second, collaborative value chain risks are obstacles to investments, but resource 
efficiency will increasingly require a shift from traditional, linear value chains 
towards collaborative value networks. For instance, a manufacturer of a recyclable 
product may not be best positioned to process the return and disassembly of goods. 
In order to take advantage of the identified opportunity while lacking the required 
in-house technical or financial capacity, the manufacturer may seek to extend the 
boundaries of its value chain by entering into a collaborative business relation with 
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359tions come with the risk of reducing one’s flexibility to make changes in firms’ own 
operations, particularly because such a circular value network will be formed 
according to the long-term prospects of cooperation. Any loss of flexibility needs 
to be compensated through the advantages of the collaborative model, such as long 
and secure business relationships with the relevant partners in the value chain.
Third, resource efficiency investments entail balance sheet implications. In ser-
vice-based models, the producer remains the owner of its material resources or 
products for a number of years, enabling easier return, refurbishment, remanufac-
turing, and reuse. In the circular economy context, it can start to be applied to new 
asset classes, like lower value consumer products with shorter life (low capital 
assets). These services or leasing based set-ups usually require substantial upfront 
investment costs. Securing financing becomes a critical issue, particularly for 
small companies with no or little revenue who want to rent-out or lease low capi-
tal assets. Additionally, products that otherwise would have been sold would, in 
principle, remain on the company’s balance sheet. In most cases, such an increase 
in the size of the operating assets also leads to a decrease of the average liquidity 
of the company’s overall assets, potentially leading to higher cost of capital (Ortiz-
Molina and Phillips, 2010).
Fourth, cash flow considerations can also impede investors in pursuing resource 
efficiency investments. In a circular economy, the end-user is less likely to be the 
end-buyer or ultimate owner which results in completely different cash flow mod-
els. In traditional supply chains, products pass from one seller to a buyer through 
a succession of purchases. In a circular economy, the flow of cash may resemble 
more that of a lease or rental contract, which results in high upfront costs and 
small paybacks over longer time periods. Potential upsides consist in an increase 
in the client base and more stable and predictable revenues in the longer term. This 
of course depends on and can be influenced by the customers’ contracts. There-
fore, the volume and diversity of the customer portfolio and the diversity of obli-
gations, and related client and legal risks need to be factored in when assessing the 
riskiness of the model.
While such factors can deter investors from financing resource efficiency, Goo-
vaerts and Verbeek (2018) conclude that banks and other financial institutions can 
make an important contribution to the transition towards a circular economy, espe-
cially because the linear economy entails market risks (price volatility, depletion), 
operational risks (lack of resilient value chains), business risks (failure to take 
advantage of business opportunities), legal risks (polluter pays principle) and repu-
tational risks (credit ratings). In Table 3, the authors provide further details on the 
types of instruments financial institutions can apply to finance resource efficiency. 
The first column refers to type of financial actor, and the second and third column 
provide further details on the kind of products available and the way these could 
support financing circular projects. In practice, a combination of these instruments 
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360 Table 3
Supply and demand for financing circular business models
Bank finance
Corporate debt
Traditional corporate lending to finance 
circular businesses with guarantees at 
corporate level.
Lease
Can fit pay per use earning models. Applicable 
to clients that are creditworthy and products 
with predictable residual values in second 
hand markets.
Factoring & supply 
chain finance
Can solve the pre-financing issue of pay per 
use earning models by selling uncertain future 
cash flows to a financial institution.









Valuable sources of finance for mostly larger 
and mature circular businesses that meet the 




Most circular businesses are still at their pilot 
stage, are not profitable yet, or are lacking  
a track record. Non-commercial finance can 
bridge the gap from pilot stage to growth 
stage, as they have a longer-term view, more 






Finance source for the many start-up 
businesses in the circular economy. However, 
their requirement for high growth and 
relatively fast payback horizons might limit 
suitability for circular businesses.




Offer new payment facilities and possibly 
working capital solutions.
Crowdfunding
Peer2Peer lending Finance source for circular businesses that 
involve the (local) community or those based 
upon ideas that appeal to the crowd.Equity investment
Source: (Goovaerts and Verbeek, 2018).
Goovaerts and Verbeek (2018) conclude that to support projects with a positive 
economic and societal rate of return that are not privately financed (e.g., due to 
market failures), carefully calibrated public support can provide bridge capital, 
thereby reducing risks for private investors and lower the associated interest rate 
costs for the lenders. The aim of these interventions is to foster catalytic effects on 
potential co-investors and attract more funding to projects of high value added. In 
this context, innovative public-private risk sharing instruments, or blending of pub-
lic and private sources of funding, thus going beyond traditional grants, are impor- 




































































43 (4) 345-373 (2019)
361private investor could provide advantageous debt finance by accepting higher risk 
profiles or less collateral, or by charging lower interest rates or providing similar 
advantages compared to their ordinary financing activities. To limit the public 
exposure to risk, a contractually agreed cap on portfolio losses could be applied.
Jollands and Hirsch (2018) provide a perspective from EBRD by showcasing 
investment strategies and practical examples of investments that deliver improved 
resource efficiency, especially at the firm level. The authors provide insights into 
and understanding of what is required, by businesses and banks, to improve 
resource efficiency in firms around the world. The authors argue that a mix of 
financial support measures (e.g., credit line technology selector, engaging local 
banks) and on the ground policy improvements (e.g., minimum energy efficiency 
labels, training and capacity, waste tariff reform) would support the further uptake 
of resource efficiency investments. With a focus on financial infrastructure and 
project finance, the authors conclude that it is important to create an environment 
in which businesses are incentivised to invest in resource efficiency projects. The 
role of MDBs in enabling resource efficiency investments is particularly crucial 
since it can showcase the financial and environmental viability of resource effi-
ciency projects, especially in developing or emerging economies.
4.2 POLICY MEASURES FOR ENHANCING RESOURCE EFFICIENCY 
Overall, the insights presented in this article suggest that even when investment 
projects are implemented and resource efficiency is increased successfully, this 
does not guarantee the full realisation of economic and environmental benefits. As 
argued in Hughes and Ekins (2018), integrated policy and regulatory strategies are 
needed that go beyond a focus on investments, and align resource efficiency 
objectives with the wider sustainable development, climate change mitigation, 
and circular economy agendas. The authors show that a tailored combination of 
policy measures is needed, comprising the following aspects:
 i. Addressing the lack of information or imperfect information through infor-
mation policies (e.g., energy efficiency labelling);
 ii. Addressing financial risk by creating more favourable conditions for long 
term investment (e.g., through MDBs);
 iii. Addressing the hidden costs which impede identification of cross-firm syn-
ergies, by establishing knowledge transfer networks and industrial symbio-
sis programmes (e.g., the industrial symbiosis component of the Japanese 
Eco-Town Programme);
 iv. Addressing split incentives through regulation (e.g., extended producer 
respon sibility schemes);
 v. Addressing the incomplete pricing of externalities through fiscal measures 
(e.g., landfill tax);
 vi. Addressing the lack of private sector investment in innovation due to risk 
perception, through public investment in R&D, creation of research clusters, 
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362 In this context, Rentschler, Bleischwitz, and Flachenecker (2018) also argue that 
the variety of investment barriers to improving efficiency suggests the need for a 
carefully designed package of complementary policy measures. Ambitious 
resource efficiency targets set by governments will require tailored measures that 
can help a firm quickly to overcome investment barriers. At the same time the 
market and government failures that led to investment barriers in the first place 
must also be addressed, as they will create new and perpetuate existing inefficien-
cies (Cagno et al., 2013; Sudhakara Reddy, 2013). This is important in order to 
achieve a larger scale enhancement of resource and energy efficiency, as well as 
to sustain efficiency gains and green development over time (Bleischwitz, 2012). 
Sorrell (2003) argue that carbon pricing can be at the heart of such a policy mix, 
though trade-offs due to policy interactions may exist. Fankhauser et al. (2011) 
also suggest that combining multiple climate policy instruments entails risks to 
efficiency – though they mainly focus on combing different carbon pricing instru-
ments, rather than complementary policies more broadly.
Essentially, this prescribes two complementary policy approaches to tackling 
firms’ investment barriers: (i) Addressing the immediate Symptoms of investment 
barriers, i.e., help firms to deal with and overcome the adverse effects of pre-
existing investment barriers (e.g., supply specific technical information needed 
for increasing energy efficiency in a firm/sector); and (ii) addressing the underly-
ing Causes of investment barriers, i.e., resolving the pre-existing market failures 
and structural inefficiencies that cause the barriers in the first place (e.g., fix over-
all information infrastructure and technology dissemination systems). These 
approaches are not mutually exclusive, and both need to be part of a comprehen-
sive strategy for resource efficiency. 
Policy measures for strengthening resource efficiency can broadly be distin-
guished into micro and macro level interventions: i.e. firm level measures, which 
support firms in overcoming the above-mentioned investment barriers, and more 
comprehensive macro level measures, which reform the structural deficiencies 
and inefficiencies of the overall system (see Table 4). 
Micro level measures directly support specific firms with the implementation of effi-
ciency projects, modernisation and green innovation – especially when firms may 
otherwise struggle to implement necessary changes. Such support comprises both 
technical assistance (especially for building capacity), as well as financial assistance, 
which can enable concrete efficiency-enhancing measures at the firm level in the 
presence of financial barriers (Anderson and Newell, 2004). The European Inte-
grated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau of the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission is one example for developing and reviewing best available 
techniques (BAT) reference documents that help reducing the information constraints 
of firms and industries by identifying and promoting BAT for resource efficiency for 
the energy industry, refineries, manufacturing of metals, waste treatment and incin-
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363all, micro level measures can be effective in facilitating quick efficiency gains in 
targeted industries, and may (eventually) lead to a bottom-up improvement of sector-
wide environmental performance. Firm-level measures are however less suitable for 
resolving the structural causes of barriers to green investment. 
Macro-level interventions should implement policy and regulatory reforms, which 
correct mis-aligned incentive structures, and improve the investment environment 
within which firms operate (Sudhakara Reddy, 2013). As at the firm level, macro 
measures comprise non-monetary and monetary ones, both of which are necessary 
to address the underlying causes of investment barriers. 
Table 4
Policy measures and interventions




























Building strategies  






































Fiscal policy reforms 



























Note: This typology presents a toolbox for micro and macro interventions for enhancing resource 
efficiency. The categorisation is indicative and not definite: For instance, micro level measures 
may eventually lead to more structural macro improvements. 
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364 Joined-up policy is also required to consider sectors that may unavoidably lose out 
in a resource efficient transition. As Section 3.2 suggests, innovative firms in 
resource-intensive sectors are likely to benefit from the transition, while others 
might lag behind. Compensation and incentivising retraining to increase mobility 
and diversify skill sets may be able to reduce the socioeconomic impacts of poten-
tial sectoral and regional declines, and may help to reinvigorate local economies 
based on more resource efficient activities. Joined-up policy may also be critical 
for limiting the impact of the rebound effect. In conclusion, an integrated policy 
approach that recognises complex economic incentives and trade-offs, supports 
decision makers on the ground, promotes innovation in technologies and pro-
cesses, and offers a clear long-term direction of travel, will have a greater chance 
of achieving resource efficiency.
5 FUTURE RESEARCH NEEDS
This article also highlights that the understanding and evidence base on resource 
efficiency is far from complete. To enable effective evidence-based policy mak-
ing, further research is required in several areas. In this section, based on Flache-
necker and Rentschler (2018), we highlight three priority areas in which further 
work is needed to improve the understanding of the implications of the resource 
transition.
5.1 DATA AVAILABILITY, QUALITY, AND COMPARABILITY
Having access to high-quality, relevant, and comparable data is crucial for ensur-
ing evidence-based policy making. In short, data are the basis for essentially every 
analysis on the resource transition. Since the systematic analysis of resource flows 
and their role in economic systems is still a relatively recent field of research, 
comprehensive databases are also crucial for strengthening current methodologies 
for calculating resource indicators, and testing the various underlying assump-
tions and approaches. 
Flachenecker, Rentschler and de Kleuver (2018) emphasise that reliance on 
accounts and indicators that use different methodologies either across time or 
countries is problematic for any systematic analysis. This is particularly relevant 
for assessing the indirect resource use embodied in trade, as dependable data 
across countries are often sparse (on the sector and firm level) or inconsistent with 
national data. While there is work underway across international agencies to 
improve and harmonise existing data sources and calculation methods, these 
efforts need to be recognised and adopted through efforts at the national level. 
This work is expected to usefully support the monitoring of the SDGs 8 and 12. 
Related research provides further insights into the sectoral distribution of GHG 
emissions in a consistent and internationally comparable manner with a view to 
inform the Paris Climate Agreement with more granular insights (Flachenecker, 
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365In addition to the harmonisation of databases, their scope and coverage also 
require expansion. In particular, accounting for material resources and deriving 
conventional material resource indicators need to be complemented by consist-
ently taking secondary material resource use (recycling as well as up- and down-
cycling) into account. This would provide more comprehensive measures, not 
only to monitor developments towards greater resource efficiency, but also of the 
circularity with which resources are used throughout the economy. Eurostat’s 
material use rate is a step in this direction (European Commission, 2018a), while 
facing several limitations. For instance, the underlying assumption that more sec-
ondary materials substitute primary raw materials, thus avoiding the extraction of 
primary material is generally correct, but it is important to consider the spatial 
dimension since empirical analysis suggests that secondary raw materials might 
substitute for imports of secondary raw materials but not of primary raw materials 
(Dussaux and Glachant, 2015; European Commission, 2018c).
5.2  IDENTIFY POTENTIALLY ADVERSELY AFFECTED SECTORS AND 
REGIONS OF THE RESOURCE TRANSITION
Future research is also required to study in much greater detail the types of firms, 
sectors, and regions that may be adversely affected by the resource transition. 
Crucially, a clearer understanding needs to be developed of why certain actors 
may fail to benefit from increased resource efficiency. This information is critical 
for finding adequate responses for affected sectors and regions (Flachenecker, 
2018; Hughes and Ekins, 2018). Simply emphasising the positive effects while 
overlooking downside risks for certain firms, sectors, and regions will ultimately 
undermine trust in the very institutional framework that could support those 
affected not only in coping with but also in benefitting from this transition in the 
medium to long-term.
Possible responses may include the acceleration or slowing of the transition for 
certain sectors, and supporting the re-training and re-employment of the affected 
work force. Such mitigating measures will be critical for ensuring a seamless 
transition towards a resource-efficient and circular growth model, and help to pre-
pare the work force for future demand related to skills in the areas of resource 
efficiency and circular business models. This in turn could enable local communi-
ties to be at the forefront of the resource transition. However, successfully mod-
erating this transition will require first of all a detailed understanding of the 
expected effects certain groups in society will be confronted with.
5.3  EXPLORING THE ROLE OF RESOURCE EFFICIENCY IN ACHIEVING  
A CIRCULAR ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
While resource efficiency investments tend to be limited to individual production 
units, firms, or sectors, the transition towards a circular economy requires targeted 
measures to integrate supply and value chains throughout the entire economy. Fur-
ther research can help to improve our understanding of how incremental firm-level 
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366 towards a circular economy. This can enable policy makers to reconcile resource 
efficiency policies with longer-term objectives for increasing the circularity of 
resource flows across sectors, and to design adequate policy strategies and targets.
Moreover, further case-specific research is needed to understand how resource 
efficiency measures can contribute to improving environmental, social, and eco-
nomic sustainability. The evidence presented in this article suggests that the eco-
nomic and environmental net benefit of resource efficiency measures is not always 
straight forward to determine, and varies significantly from case to case, sector to 
sector, and country to country. In addition, further research is required to under-
stand how the wide-ranging priorities under the SDGs may increase the demand 
for resources and intensify existing scarcities (Bleischwitz and Flachenecker, 
2017). For instance, the objective of scaling up renewable energy generation and 
storage is likely to significantly increase the demand for certain resources and pos-
sibly interfere with the goal of reducing resource dependencies. Thus, the design 
of resource efficiency strategies must be aligned with technological changes and 
the evolving needs and priorities of the sustainable development agenda.
6 CONCLUSIONS
High and volatile resource prices, uncertain supply, rising demand and environ-
mental impacts – various factors are putting increasing pressure on policy makers, 
researchers, firms, and investors to explore pathways towards sustainable and effi-
cient resource management. An increase in resource efficiency is considered to be 
an answer to these challenges.
This article outlines the numerous initiatives on the international level that have 
highlighted the important role of resource efficiency in policy agendas. However, 
while political support for resource efficiency is important, trends show that it is 
by no means sufficient. Indeed, the article shows that global progress in enhancing 
resource efficiency is outpaced by an ever-increasing demand for material 
resources. It has been shown that barriers and the ubiquitous prevalence of market 
failures and distortions prevent resource efficiency investments from taking place. 
Furthermore, the article provides evidence for the complexity of evaluating costs 
and benefits of resource efficiency investments, which need to be benchmarked to 
the ‘cost of inaction’ and external effects are to be internalised.
Findings are also presented on the effects of resource efficiency investments on 
competitiveness and GHG emissions in EU countries, at both the macroeconomic 
and the firm level, suggesting a heterogeneous picture. While firms in certain sectors 
are likely to gain from the resource transition, other parts of the economy may see 
adverse impacts, thus raising the question of how short-term distributional effects 
can be mitigated. Therefore, nuanced conclusions on the effect of resource effi-
ciency on competitiveness and climate change mitigation need to be drawn. In par-
ticular, it seems essential to conduct further research on the potential trade-offs at the 
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367the progress of the economy to a more resource efficient path. From a policy per-
spective, it is essential to develop measures to mitigate adverse effects in order to 
ensure the continued political support for pursuing the resource efficiency agenda.
The article further provides insights from institutional investors on the challenges 
and strategies to overcome investment barriers to enhance resource efficiency. 
Indeed, especially in developing and emerging economies, multilateral develop-
ment banks can play a crucial role in resolving information barriers, facilitating 
technology transfer, mitigating financing constraints, and thus encouraging first 
movers. However, as this article outlines, governments ultimately play the crucial 
role in enabling resource efficiency investments by adopting integrated policy 
measures that address the causes and symptoms of resource inefficiency, and thus 
establish the necessary business environment to unlock the potential of resource 
efficiency investments. 
Overall, this article, based on Flachenecker and Rentschler (2018), outlines the 
complex economic incentives and trade-offs associated with resource efficiency 
investments. It provides an analytical framework for assessing the prospects and 
viability of such investments in practice; and proposes policy strategies for over-
coming investment barriers and boosting resource efficiency investments. In 
doing so, this article aims to guide future research, and contribute to the design 
and implementation of more effective resource efficiency policies – and thus facil-
itate the transition to more resource-efficient and sustainable development path-
ways. Close collaboration among researchers, practitioners, policy makers, and 
the broader public is likely to be of crucial importance in combining the necessary 
evidence base, scale, and democratic legitimacy in successfully steering the 
resource transition. 
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